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Arbitrary Rationality
United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
I
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Batson v. Kentucky'
limited the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of race, courts and
commentators have struggled to reconcile what Blackstone called an "arbitrary
and capricious" right2 with the demands of the Equal Protection Clause? That
tension was most recently evident in United States v. Annigoni,4 which upheld
the traditional remedy of automatic reversal for convictions obtained following
the erroneous denial of a peremptory despite the significant limitations that
Batson and its progeny have placed upon the traditional fight to challenge
jurors without cause.5 While this ironclad rule regarding peremptory remedies
seems at odds with the introduction of scrutiny to the exercise of the
peremptory right, this Case Note will argue that Annigoni can best be
understood as part of a broader convergence between the jurisprudence of
peremptory challenges and selective prosecutions.6 This convergence raises the
question of whether courts are approaching peremptory fights with an eye
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. 4 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENrTARtS *346.
3. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding peremptory challenges based on gender
unconstitutional); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (barrng race-based peremptones exercised
by criminal defendants); see also Karen M. Bray. Reaching rie Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REv. 517 (1992); Eric L. Muller. Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error
Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment. 106 YALE Li. 93 (1996).
4. 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
5. See id. at 1134. Other courts have reached similar results. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., 61 F.3d 147
(3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993); Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson
Wax Dev. Corp., 908 E2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990). But cf Cudjoe v. Virginia. 475 S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App.
1996) (applying harmless error standard heavily deferential to peremptory right).
6. The seminal selective prosecution case is lick Wo it Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). which set aside
a conviction, without regard to the actual guilt of the plaintiff in error, based on racially dscnrunatory
enforcement.
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toward protecting the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried
by an impartial jury.
7
II
Annigoni arose out of a conviction for bank fraud, in which the
defendant's peremptory challenge against an Asian-American juror was denied
by the District Court as racially motivated.8 On appeal, the panel determined
that this denial had been erroneous because the prospective juror's experience
with litigation over a limited partnership investment constituted ample
justification to rebut a Batson challenge.9 Nevertheless, the conviction was
sustained on the ground that the denial constituted harmless error because there
was no evidence that it had affected the eventual verdict."0 An en banc panel
of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the application of harmless error
analysis was incorrect and that only automatic reversal could remedy the
erroneous denial of a peremptory."
The en banc majority relied in large part on Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Arizona v. Fulminante, 2 which distinguished between "trial errors"
that can be assessed qualitatively by reviewing courts for harmlessness and
"structural errors" that compromise the trial mechanism itself and require
automatic reversal.' 3 After an expansive paean to the peremptory challenge,
the majority explained that, "[t]o subject the denial of a peremptory challenge
to harmless-error analysis would require appellate courts to do the impossible:
to reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through nothing more than
post-trial hearings and sheer speculation."' 4 Nevertheless, the court reserved
judgment on the question of whether such a denial constitutes structural error,
relying instead upon the importance traditionally accorded by the peremptory
right to justify the continued application of the rule of automatic reversal. 5
As the dissenters point out, however, the presumption that all errors
resistant to appellate analysis are harmful is untenable.' 6 Structural error has
been understood to serve as a proxy for those defects that are conclusively
7. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. Recent case law on peremptory challenges has relied almost
exclusively on equal protection analysis. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US.
79, 84-85 n.4 (1986). But see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (upholding peremptory challenges
against Sixth Amendment claim).
8. Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1136 (quoting sidebar in trial record).
9. See United States v. Annigoni, 68 F.3d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 96 E3d 1132.
10. See id. at 285.
11. See Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1134.
12. 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
13. See Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1143. In reaching its conclusion, the majority also distinguished Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988), which held that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was
harmless error notwithstanding the defendant's eventual loss of a peremptory challenge to correct the error.
14. Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1145.
15. See id. at 1144.
16. See id. at 1147 (Leavy, J., dissenting); id. at 1150 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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harmful, and the inability of the majority to place peremptories within that
category suggests that prejudice might not always follow from their denial.'
7
This is a particularly important question because the harm of allowing
discriminatory peremptories is clear after Batson, yet Annigoni equates the
remedy for that wrong of constitutional dimension with the remedy for a
violation of what has heretofore been considered a mere statutory right of
uncertain significance.' s Such asymmetry is not only unkempt as a matter of
doctrine, but creates a disincentive for district courts to enforce Batson
vigorously.
The dissenters also call into question the vitality of the tradition invoked
by the majority to support automatic reversal. Although virtually unlimited in
scope before Batson, within the last decade peremptories have been constrained
by the Equal Protection Clause, and, as the dissenters in Annigoni emphasize,
"[b]ecause the peremptory challenge has changed, our review of the trial
court's scrutiny of its exercise must change, too."'9 Nevertheless, their
response-applying harmless error review to an error that can never be
adjudged harmful-rings hollow in light of the Supreme Court's continuing
support of the challenge as critical to a fair trial and the fundamental principle
that for every right there must be a remedy. 0 The result, as Judge Kozinski
complained, is that "we are forced to choose from two all-or-nothing rules: the
error is always harmless or it is never harmless.' What justifies choosing
one over the other?
InI
This dilemma and its accompanying doctrinal confusion stem from the
examination of a practice based on the arbitrary hunches of trial attorneys
through the lens of a principle, embodied in the Equal Protection Clause, that
demands a "rational basis" for drawing legal distinctions.2 As the latter is of
constitutional dimension, many have concluded that it must inevitably swallow
17. See, e.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) ("In effect, then, the hannfulness of
structural errors can be conclusively presumed."). cert. dented, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995); see also Anugont.
96 F.3d at 1149-50 (Leavy, J., dissenting) (arguing that peremptory denial cannot be structural error).
18. See Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1148 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
19. Id. (Leavy, J., dissenting); see. e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
20. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 163 (1803); Anrngoni. 96 F.3d at 1148 (Leavy.
J., dissenting); id. at 1150 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 500 U.S.
614, 630 (1991) (commenting on "role of litigants in determining the jury's composition"); Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482 (1990) (stating that requirement of jury impartality "in no way could . . be
interpreted directly or indirectly to prohibit [peremptories]").
21. Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1150 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
22. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-24 (1986) (Burger. C.. dissenting); cf. Cit) of
Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (voiding as irrational zoning regulation
concerning mentally retarded).
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
the former and lead to the abolition of peremptories.23 More pertinent to an
analysis of Annigoni is the related contention that the peremptory's status as
a right of subconstitutional importance demands, at a minimum, that Judge
Kozinski's paradox be answered with a finding that peremptory error is never
harmful.24 Comparing peremptory strike case law with that of selective
prosecutions, another legal niche that seeks to harmonize arbitrary discretion
with equal protection principles, however, suggests exactly the opposite
reading. 25
The connection between peremptory challenges and claims of selective
prosecution, where laws are enforced "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, 26 was made explicitly, albeit briefly, in United States v. Armstrong,27
which established the discovery standards for selective prosecution. 2 This
connection is more than rhetorical, for both share the anomaly of a rule of
automatic reversal despite a failure to conform to the category of structural
error.29 Ever since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 30 courts have stated that a successful
claim of selective prosecution must lead to reversal.3 This is particularly
noteworthy because the Court has been reluctant in recent years to apply
automatic reversal to errors that do not undermine confidence in the verdict's
accuracy.32 But selective prosecution claims do not affect a verdict's
accuracy. As the Court noted in Armstrong: "A selective-prosecution claim is
not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent
assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by
the Constitution. 33 As such, it is neither structural error nor trial error, for
23. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cmii. L.
REV. 153, 157 (1989).
24. See Muller, supra note 3, at 143 n.294.
25. Two other commonalities between peremptory challenges and selective prosecutions are worth
noting. First, prevailing on an equal protection claim in both areas is exceptionally difficult. Compare P.S.
Kane, Student Commentary, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for
Selective Prosecution, 67 Tot.. L. REv. 2293, 2303 (1993), with Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
1099, 1106-13 (1994). Second, equal protection claims in both areas are given hardly any scrutiny under
rational basis review. Compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (affirming broad
prosecutorial discretion without need for disclosure of rationale), with Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769,
1770 (per curiam) (sustaining challenge of juror who "had long curly hair" without examining rationality).
26. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
27. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
28. See id. at 1488 (establishing that defendants seeking discovery must show evidence of similarly
situated persons not prosecuted).
29. Although the Court reserved judgment in Armstrong on the question of whether such a rule was
to be applied without exception, see id. at 1484 n.2, reversal is the only remedy that has ever been applied
once selective prosecution was established, see, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374; United States v. Berrigan,
482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973).
30. 118 U.S. 356.
31. See, e.g., id. at 374; Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 174; United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th
Cir. 1972). Although written after the trial error/structural error dichotomy was introduced in Fulminante,
the Armstrong opinion does not alter this view. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
32. See Muller, supra note 3, at 107-16.
33. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (emphasis added).
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it does not suggest that the defendant's guilt was established in an unfair trial
or one whose outcome would have been changed if a malfeasant prosecutor
had had more benign motives. Nevertheless, courts still apply automatic
reversal for error, just as Annigoni does for peremptory challenges.'
The reason for the courts' approach in selective prosecution cases is
simple: They are explicitly balancing settled constitutional norms of equal
protection and separation of powers. Extraordinary judicial deference to
prosecutorial choices ultimately "stems from a concern not to unnecessarily
impair the performance of a core executive function. '" The peremptory
challenge cases share with selective prosecution doctrine an unusual remedial
result borne out of a concern for synthesizing unbridled discretion with
antidiscrimination norms. This suggests that courts evaluating the peremptory
right are implicitly conducting a similar balancing act, but in this case between
the demands of equal protection and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that all
criminal defendants have the right to trial "by an impartial jury."36
Beginning with Batson, the Court has based its analysis of peremptory
challenges on the equal protection harm inflicted on jurors rather than on the
Sixth Amendment right of defendants. 7 In part, this stems from the holding
in Stilson v. United States3" that peremptories are not a fundamental right.
39
The fact that peremptory challenges are not a constitutionally mandated means,
however, need not be construed to block consideration of the impact the
constitutional end of an impartial jury might have on the challenge once it has
been selected by legislatures as the preferred procedural device. This insight
may have animated the Annigoni majority's strained attempt to protect the
remedy of automatic reversal. A brief survey of jury history will demonstrate
just how crucial the Sixth Amendment's command should be for any judicial
analysis of the peremptory challenge.
To interpret the requirement of jury impartiality, one must begin with the
concept that jury decisionmaking is fundamentally subjective. As early as
Bushell's Case,4 the first major decision on jury authority in Anglo-
American law, Lord Chief Justice Vaughan rejected attempts to reexamine jury
factfinding and punish jurors for "incorrect" verdicts with the famous
observation that, "[a] man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers
ear, no more can a man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers
34. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
35. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (emphasis added). In response to the argument that a criminal
defendant's peremptory right cannot be construed as equivalent to a "core execuuvc function," the Sixth
Amendment's guarantees can be read as collectively supporting a defendant's core right to receive a fair
trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. supra note 35.
37. See supra note 7.
38. 230 U.S. 583 (1919).
39. This holding is somewhat shaky precedent given its factual context: the Court's effort to enforce
the Espionage Act against publishers of -'subversive" Lithuanian literature. See id. at 584.
40. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
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understanding or reasoning.' In deferring to jury factfinding, our judicial
system has acknowledged that the search for objective criteria to frame factual
inquiries is generally fruitless, because human perceptions will and do
differ.42 Just as we are skeptical about the objective assessment of jury
factfinding by courts, so too should we be skeptical that the constitutionally
mandated impartiality of the jurors who judge those facts can be assessed
objectively by courts. Peremptory challenges capture this skepticism by
circumventing "objective" judicial control over voir dire. Moreover, the
command of jury impartiality in the Sixth Amendment cannot escape reference
to the criminal defendant whose rights that Amendment protects. In this sense,
one person's impartial jury can be another's stacked deck due to differing
perceptions about the venire. Hence, both history and the Sixth Amendment
lend support to an understanding of the peremptory as crucial to a fair trial.4 3
While no case has explicitly recognized the constitutional dimension of the
peremptory, that may have less to do with the merits than with the peculiar
procedural status of the right before Batson. Prior to that decision, there was
no need to constitutionalize the peremptory because it hovered, sui generis,
outside judicial constraints as an inheritance of the common law. Indeed, to
have brought constitutional analysis to bear upon the peremptory arguably
would have served to diminish rather than to enhance its efficacy. Instead of
tarnishing the peremptory's legitimacy, recent cases are better understood as
an effort to strip the right of its natural law gloss by bringing it within the
positive law landscape of the twentieth century.44 That effort has implicitly
balanced the relevant positive law of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
create a new peremptory right post-Batson while maintaining a robust remedy
for its erroneous denial in cases such as Annigoni.
In an era when feelings of disempowerment often cloud the legitimacy of
the judicial system, the peremptory challenge retains a preeminent role in
giving litigants control of their destiny. The time has come for the Court to
acknowledge the legitimacy of what lower courts have been doing silently in
cases like Annigoni: adapting the peremptory challenge for the modern age.
-Gerard N. Magliocca
41. Id. at 1013.
42. The essence of Bushell's Case is codified in our Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
(prohibiting review of criminal jury acquittal); cf id. amend. VII (prohibiting review of facts found by
juries in civil cases).
43. One might ask why the same argument does not apply to judges. Aside from an appeal to tradition,
the answer lies in the ultimate decisionmaking authority of the criminal jury, along with the asymmetry in
the manner of decisionmaking between judge and jury. For example, judges are constrained to justify their
acts according to neutral principles established by law, whereas juries can exercise wide discretion through
a general verdict, even to the point of nullifying the applicable law. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE
THE JURY ch. 2 (1994) (outlining history of nullification).
44. See supra note 3.
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